Re: Having your boat searched?
I would like to add my 2 cents...
I am an avid supporter of the peoples rights. Working in radio, I have had my share if head to heads concerning the 1st amemdment. I have been to several seminars and what not.
I will admit that I know very little on the 4th. I firmly believe that I should not have to prove that I am not a criminal, rather the law should prove that I am. If I were to be asked anywhere other than a border crossing or by a border patrol agent to search my vehicle, my first question would certainly be on what grounds. I would rather sit there all day then "give in" to them.
That being said, I think that the people arguing for the 4th amemdment regarding boats saying that they cannot search without a warrent are wrong. Don't misunderstand, that is the side I am on. But after reading the full article regarding vessles, the proof is in the pudding.
Vessel Searches.--Not only is the warrant requirement
inapplicable to brief stops of vessels, but also none of the safeguards
applicable to stops of automobiles on less than probable cause are
necessary predicates to stops of vessels. In United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez,\74\ the Court upheld a random stop and boarding of a
vessel by customs agents, lacking any suspicion of wrongdoing, for
purpose of inspecting documentation. The boarding was authorized by
statute derived from an act of the First Congress,\75\ and hence had
``an impressive historical pedigree'' carrying with it a presumption of
constitutionality. Moreover, ``important factual differences between
vessels located in waters offering ready access to the open sea and
automobiles on principal thoroughfares in the border area'' justify
application of a less restrictive rule for vessel searches. The reason
why random stops of vehicles have been held impermissible under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court explained, is that stops at fixed
checkpoints or roadblocks are both feasible and less subject to abuse of
discretion by authorities. ``But no reasonable claim can be made that
permanent checkpoints would be practical on waters such as these where
vessels can move in any direction at any time and need not follow
established `avenues' as automobiles must do.''\76\ Because there is a
``substantial'' governmental interest in enforcing documentation laws,
``especially in waters where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is
great,'' the Court found the ``limited'' but not ``minimal'' intrusion
occasioned by boarding for documentation inspection to be
reasonable.\77\ Dis
[[Page 1242]]
senting Justice Brennan argued that the Court for the first time was
approving ``a completely random seizure and detention of persons and an
entry onto private, noncommercial premises by police officers, without
any limitations whatever on the officers' discretion or any safeguards
against abuse.''\78\
\74\462 U.S. 579 (1983). The opinion of the Court, written by
Justice Rehnquist, was joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices
White, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Brennan's dissent was
joined by Justice Marshall and, on mootness but not on the merits, by
Justice Stevens.
\75\19 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(a), derived from Sec. 31 of the Act of
Aug. 4, 1790, ch.35, 1 Stat. 164.
\76\462 U.S. at 589. Justice Brennan's dissent argued that a
fixed checkpoint was feasible in this case, involving a ship channel in
an inland waterway. id. at at 608 n.10. The fact that the Court's
rationale was geared to the difficulties of law enforcement in the open
seas suggests a reluctance to make exceptions to the general rule. Note
as well the Court's later reference to this case as among those
``reflect[ing] longstanding concern for the protection of the integrity
of the border.'' United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
538 (1985).
\77\462 U.S. at 593.
\78\462 U.S. at 598. Justice Brennan contended that all previous
cases had required some ``discretion-limiting'' feature such as a
requirement of probable cause, reasonable suspicion, fixed checkpoints
instead of roving patrols, and limitation of border searches to border
areas, and that these principles set forth in Delaware v. Prouse (supra
p.1239, n.63) should govern. 462 U.S. at 599, 601.
taken from
here
